The national factor in Ukraine's quadruple transition

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In recent years some 'transitologists' have accepted that stateness should be added to democratization and marketization when discussing the transformation of former communist societies. Nevertheless, the national question remains an area either included within stateness (dubbed as a 'triple transition' by Offe)[1] or still removed altogether from the agenda of those studying post-communist transition. This article argues that including the question of stateness was a welcome step by 'transitologists' but that it did not go far enough. It then goes on to discuss the national question and argue that it should also feature prominently in any discussion of post-communist transition. Offe's 'triple transition' is theoretically expanded to a 'quadruple transition' and this thesis is then applied to one particular country, Ukraine.

This article is divided into three sections. The first surveys the theoretical literature on post-communist transition, democratization and civil society. Ukraine's quadruple transition of state and nation building, democratization and marketization is then discussed with reference to this theoretical literature. The second section investigates the impact of the Soviet legacy on Ukraine's quadruple transition. The final section discusses the Soviet legacy with reference to three key areas in Ukraine's post-communist transition (politics, civil society and ethnic relations).

Transitology, democratization and nationhood

This section asks why political theory and the literature on post-communist transition, which has come to be defined as 'transitology', ignores two critical factors—the state and nation (or political community). It argues that democracies and market economies require bounded states, integrated political communities and a 'people' within which, and with whom, to operate. As Prezworski points out, 'without an effective state, there can be no democracy and no markets'.[2] The neo-liberal prescription therefore for post-communist states, Przeworski has persuasively argued, ignored the role of the state in making the exercise of liberal democracy possible:[3]

> (it) underestimates the role of state institutions in organising both the public and the private life of groups and individuals. If democracy is to be sustained, the state must guarantee territorial integrity and physical security, it must maintain the conditions necessary for an effective exercise of citizenship, it must mobilise public savings, co-ordinate resource allocation, and correct income distribution.

Munck believes that, the variance of democratization in post-communist Europe is dependent upon two factors. Firstly, the character of the prior regime type.

Secondly, the degree of stateness. Combined together, these two factors affect the prospects for democratic consolidation and shape the number of difficult challenges which need to be overcome.[4] Post-Soviet countries such as Ukraine spent far longer under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes than did their counterparts in southern Europe or Latin America which never became totalitarian and did not have to grapple with inherited weak and multinational states. An exception was Spain but it had a well-established national identity (Castillian Spanish) and was the metropolis of a large Spanish-speaking empire for centuries.

The 'double' or 'triple' transition facing post-communist countries such as Ukraine, as seen by Hall and Offe respectively, is defined by them as 'daunting' and 'without precedent'.[5] Motyl believes that, 'the simultaneous construction of states, markets, democratic rule of law, and civil society—was historically unprecedented in its magnitude'.[6] Offe adds that, 'This upheaval is a revolution without a historical model and a revolution without a revolutionary theory'.[7] Post-communist states such as Ukraine inherited national minorities, secessionist threats, the need to define the 'we', obtain legal recognition of inherited borders and establish a legislative and constitutional framework within a short period of time. Civil society, fully functioning institutions and national unity are lacking and society is not yet differentiated to help facilitate the functioning of a market economy, In western Europe change of such magnitude did not take place simultaneously, as a state and nation more often than not preceded the creation of democracies and market economies while transition in Latin America and southern Europe was regime based.

Canovan is one of a few political theorists who has persuasively argued that nationhood is a necessary condition of the liberal democratic welfare state—a factor largely ignored by political theory which assumes that a territorially bound political community is already in place. Nationhood is at the heart of political theory, Canovan believes, because liberal democracies require states and political communities. The question of how they appear is though ignored in the theoretical literature.

Nationhood generates collective power, creates a 'we' (unity, legitimacy, permanence), enables mobilization and representation and provides people ready to make the highest of sacrifices for a political community that is both modern and based upon some ethnic, cultural and historical factors. The presumed existence of this nationhood as a prerequisite for liberal democracy also assumes recognized borders, a 'people' constituting a political community within those borders who do not call into question these boundaries.

In a celebrated piece, Rustow also believes that stable democracies not only require sound economies and high per capita incomes. They also need a consensus on certain values and beliefs through which the community is united where boundaries are fixed and the composition of citizenship 'continuous'. In a democracy, therefore, the majority of citizens 'must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong'.[8] National unity, Rustow believes, means that 'There must be a prior sense of community, preferably a sense of community quietly taken for granted that is above mere opinion and mere agreement.'[9] As we shall see later, this is certainly not the case among Ukrainians and many other Soviet successor states.[10]

A modern liberal democracy is also usually a welfare state with proportional taxation. Canovan argues, therefore, that 'social justice will be politically feasible

only in a polity with a high degree of communal solidarity' where a 'community of obligation' is in place.[11] Such a 'community of obligation' requires there to be mutual trust, a shared overarching identity and common loyalties. Miller also argues that 'trust' is required for any democracy to function effectively. A shared national identity (or 'nationality' in Miller's term) is a precondition to achieve certain political aims such as social justice and a deliberative democracy:[12] 'Trust requires solidarity not merely within groups but across them, and this in turn depends upon a common identity of the kind that nationality alone can provide.'[13]

Every society requires such values for it to constitute a cohesive polity which is usually not morally neutral because it inevitably endorses one set of behaviour and the values of the titular nation. Parekh believes that these values should be defined in its legislation and the constitution. These 'operative public values' are the societies' 'basic or primary moral structure', 'because the society cherishes them, endeavours to live by them, judges its members' behaviour in terms of them, and condemns their lapses'.[14] If such a set of 'operative public values is in place' then we can assume that they sustain a civic nation or political community, which Parekh defines thus:

> A political community is a territorially concentrated group of people bound together by their acceptance of a common mode of conducting their collective affairs, including a body of institutions and shared values. It is a public institution shared by its members collectively as a community.
> The identity of a political community lies in what all its members share not individually but collectively, not privately but publicly, and has an inescapable institutional focus.[15]

The existence of these commonly held values which underpin the overarching societal culture and identity of a political community are absent in post-communist countries such as Ukraine. The transition period from communism is therefore also the scene of often antagonistic debate about how to define the values contributing to the societal culture of the newly emerging political community. In Ukraine this is made all the more complicated by the inherited regional divisions and the legacies of Tsarist and Soviet nationality policies which divided the titular nation and purposefully set eastern against 'bourgeois nationalist' western Ukraine. In contrast, the titular nations of the three Baltic states are not divided and they can therefore rebuild their states based on shared values and memories of inter-war statehood.

Nevertheless, political theorists (and hence 'transitologists') have been reluctant to admit that a 'people' need a collective identity for a liberal democracy and democratization theory consequently ignores the bonds of unity or the qualifications for membership in a political communities. This is possibly, Canovan muses, because modern liberal democracies depend upon the collective power generated by national (particularist) loyalties which are inconsistent with the universalist loyalties of liberalism.[16] Yet, Canovan points out that, 'the problem of maintaining unity and stability has always been at the root of politics'.[17] Canovan continues:

> Polities that are going to survive, let alone be able to take action, have to be able to maintain some degree of unity and stability in face not only of the competition from other polities but of entropy resulting from the plurality and morality of human beings.[18]

As we shall see later, these assumptions could not be made in the case of post-Soviet Ukraine. Of the 22 post-communist European states only three (the Czech Republic, Serbia and the Russian Federation) inherited the infrastructure of the former metropolis. Other post-communist states inherited some degree of stateness (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania) or were incorporated into other states (the German Democratic Republic). The Soviet successor states were a mixed bag. Only the three Baltic states could draw upon a tradition of inter-war statehood and their titular nations were not divided. Two of them did though (Latvia, Estonia) inherit from the Soviet era large numbers of Russian-speaking minorities.

Post-Soviet states such as Ukraine launched into democratization and marketization without the many state and national attributes commonly assumed to be necessary for their success. Not only did Ukraine not inherit a functioning state and institutions but it lacked—and continues to lack—national unity. If we define nationhood in the manner of Canovan, as the ability to generate long-term mobilization, then Ukraine is clearly lacking in this crucial area.[19] 'Since nationalism has become the rationale of the modern developed state, the primary issue to be resolved is one of identity', Binder correctly predicted over three decades ago.[20] This makes it all the more surprising why political theorists and 'transitologists' felt they could ignore stateness and nationhood when discussing post-communist transition.

The Soviet legacy: Ukraine

The first section of this article pointed to the key components which are required for the success of democratization and marketization (secure and recognized borders, a political community, an overarching identity, commonly agreed values, national unity, state capacity and effective institutions). This section will now consider whether Ukraine inherited these factors from the former USSR.

Soviet nationality policies of 'federal colonialism' bequeathed three important legacies. Firstly, state—and in some cases nation—building for non-Russians took place at *both* the republican and the all-union levels. The non-Russian republics were designated as the homelands of the non-Russians. Localism, particularly in the post-Stalin era, was tolerated. Local republican officials were expected to maintain 'order' by keeping nationalism in check (particularly in strategically important republics such as Ukraine). Cultural standardization was never uniform; Russification and the promotion of bilingualism was far more of a threat to Ukrainians, Belarusians and Kazakhs, for example, than to Armenians or Estonians.

Secondly, non-Russians came increasingly to look upon their republics as their homelands and the borders of these republics as sacrosanct. Public opinion polls in the post-Soviet era have reflected the high degree of public support for maintaining these inherited borders. In Ukraine, separatism never became an issue except in the Crimea, a region transferred to Ukraine in 1954 with an ethnic Russian majority. This support for republican sovereignty, a factor which first became apparent in summer 1990 when declarations of state sovereignty were made by Soviet republics such as Ukraine, co-exists uneasily with the multiple pan-eastern Slavic/Soviet identities exhibited by upwards of a quarter to a third of Ukrainians and a larger proportion of Belarusians.

In the Soviet era many of these Ukrainians and Belarusians gave their identity as 'Russian', especially those who had ethnically intermarried (which by the seventies varied between 36–55% in eastern and southern Ukraine). Opinion polls in the post-Soviet era have allowed respondents in eastern Ukraine to give their identity as different to 'Ukrainian' or 'Russian'. Some have defined themselves as *both* Russian/Ukrainian[21] while others state that they are 'Soviet' (these two groups probably overlap). This fusion of Russian/Ukrainian or Soviet identities is a direct product of Soviet nationality policies and historiography which promoted the creation of a *Homo Sovieticus* based upon the Russian language and the three eastern Slavic peoples. In many ways these policies resembled those promoted by the Tsarist empire where nation building was premised upon the three eastern Slavic branches of the Russian people (*Russkii narod*) fusing into a new Russian nation. Ukrainians and Belarusians were therefore ethnographic raw material similar to the Breton and Alsace peripheries who were nationalized into the core Ile de France to create the French nation. In the former USSR these revived Tsarist policies sat uneasily with—and flatly contradicted—the other plank of Soviet nationality policies which recognized the existence of separate Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples (a factor very different to the Tsarist era) who had designated republican homelands.

The multiple identities of contemporary pan-eastern Slavists, such as Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka or former Ukrainian Parliamentary Speaker Oleksandr Tkachenko, are impossible to reconcile with their defence of republican sovereignty. In December 1998 and February 1999 Tkachenko was able to successfully persuade Communists in the Russian State Duma and the Federation Council to ratify the inter-state treaty with Ukraine. In return, Tkachenko promised to obtain parliamentary approval for Ukraine's accession to the amorphous Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (which he succeeded in accomplishing in March 1999). The normalization of Ukrainian–Russian relations and Ukraine's political integration within the CIS were seen as the stepping stone to Ukraine's eventual membership in the Russian–Belarusian union. Tkachenko's plans will though, be thwarted as have Lukashenka's because of the inherent contradiction, spelled out earlier, within these multiple identities—Slavophilism (union with the eastern Slavs premised upon a subservient Ukrainian identity *vis-à-vis* Russians) versus *Derzhavnyk* (defence of republican sovereignty and territorial integrity).

Thirdly, unlike in western and central Europe, Muscovy/Russia did not evolve into a nation before becoming an empire. Serbia existed as a nation-state for a century prior to creating Yugoslavia. Its identity was reinforced by struggles against 'Others' (Muslim Turks and Albanians, Catholic Austrians and Croatians). Within post-war Yugoslavia the confederal state system permitted Serbian republican institutions and did not promote a nationality policy which submerged Serbian within Yugoslav identity. After the disintegration of Yugoslavia the Serbian republic emerged as an (ethnic, exclusive) nation-state. In contrast, after the disintegration of the former USSR the Russian Federation did not inherit a nation-state but an amorphous and weak national identity.[22]

The Tsarist and Soviet regimes did not promote Russian nation building. Therefore, in contrast to the non-Russian republics the Russian Federation did not become accepted as a 'homeland' by the majority of ethnic Russians, only 41% of whom identify with it.[23] The Russian SFSR possessed no republican

institutions of its own until 1990 (including any republican Communist party), factors which make the relationship between Russians and the former USSR very different to those between Serbia and Yugoslavia. Ethnic Russian identity was therefore subsumed within both Tsarist and Soviet identities (in a manner to Turks in the Ottoman empire).[24] Russians were privileged as a supra-territorial nation whose migration was promoted as a means of projecting Russian and Soviet power into the non-Russian periphery. To the majority of Russians, therefore, their 'homeland' was the Tsarist empire or the former USSR—not the Russian SFSR. After the disintegration of the USSR, nostalgia for its revival remained because no other 'homeland' existed at that stage due to the low identification with the Russian Federation; particularly after the failure of CIS integration. The Russian Federation was, though, not unique in having to undertake nation building after the disintegration of their empire (similar cases are Turkey and Austria).

In the Soviet era no Russian dissidents demanded the secession of their republic from the former USSR (in one study of 802 Brezhnev era dissidents, only 36 were Russians). The Soviet regime tolerated the diffusion of Russian nationalism because since the thirties it had become interwoven with communism and the promotion of a supra-national identity. If Russian nationalism had been separatist, demanding, for example, the withdrawal of the Russian SFSR from the former USSR, it would have probably met the same fate as the other non-Russian national movements. Russian nationalists (like their English counterparts in the UK) did not, however, promote a separatist agenda. Although the Russian Federation under President Borys Yeltsin increasingly distanced itself from the Soviet centre after 1990 it, alone of the 15 Soviet republics, did *not* declare independence from the USSR.[25] In the post-Soviet era no Russian groups demand the Russian Federation's withdrawal from the CIS (unlike the non-Russian members of the CIS). In all three cases (dissidents, declaration of independence, attitudes towards the CIS) non-Russian successor states of the former USSR, such as Ukraine, are very different. Ukrainian dissidents promoted both national and democratic rights and proportionately represented the largest group of prisoners of conscience in the Brezhnev era. The Ukrainian parliament declared independence on 24 August 1991, a date commemorated annually by military parades in Kyiv. The national democratic and radical right political spectrum in Ukraine opposes any Ukrainian participation in the CIS.

Since the disintegration of the former USSR, the Russian Federation has therefore pursued contradictory policies similar to those pursued by Ukraine's and Belarus's home-grown Slavophiles (that is, those with multiple identities). State and nation building in the Russian Federation was not an immediate objective of Russian leaders in the first half of the nineties. Instead, Russian élites promoted a confederal CIS similar to the Union of Sovereign Republics of the late Soviet era (although minus the Soviet centre) which would continue to maintain the transparent internal borders of the Soviet era and provide for dual citizenship to 25 million Russians in the non-Russian Soviet successor states. A confederal CIS based upon the eastern Slavic core with amorphous borders would postpone state-nation building within the confines of the Russian Federation. Ukraine's demands that the former Soviet 'internal' borders be treated in the same manner as the former Soviet 'external' ones, which the Russian Federation only reluctantly accepted in 1997–9, have, therefore, indirectly served to weaken

Russian multiple identities while serving the cause of promoting Russian state-nation building.[26]

Nevertheless, Russian policies remain confused. While reluctantly accepting the confinement of Russian identity to the Russian Federation by Ukraine's actions it has, at the same time, pursued, since 1996, a strategy of integration with Belarus which continues to perpetuate its multiple, eastern Slavic identity. These multiple identities are both in contradiction with the mutually exclusive identity promoted by Ukraine and some groups in the Russian Federation and Belarus who desire to maintain their republican statehood. Russian nation building has, therefore, still to choose between a civic option, limited to the confines of the Russian Federation (*Rossiia*) or an ethnic alternative based on the three eastern Slavs' multiple identities (*Russkii narod or Sovetskaya rodina*) where Russians are the 'elder brothers'. The latter option has widespread support in Belarus and some support in the Donbas region of Ukraine and in the Crimea.[27]

These Soviet legacies of multiple identities explain why separatism has remained weak in Ukraine, in contrast to the former Yugoslavia. Separatism requires some degree of ethnic identity and affiliation to an external homeland. In the case of Serbs in Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina an ethnic affiliation existed with Serbia and rump Yugoslavia. In the case of the former USSR this was not the case. As has already pointed out, the Russian SFSR was not promoted as an ethnic Russian homeland by the Soviet regime because the Soviet regime promoted Soviet—not Russian—nation building based upon the Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian core. Russian identity in Ukraine and Belarus is therefore weak and amorphous with some 'Russians' now redefining themselves as Russian/Ukrainian or Soviet. Their identity and homeland is the USSR, or the next best equivalent, the Russian–Belarusian union—not the Russian federation. These Sovietophiles are a product of 'federal colonialism' which promoted a dual allegiance to both the Soviet Ukrainian SSR and the USSR. Their support is directed through left-wing parties to a pan-eastern Slavic or Soviet revival—not towards separatism.

Table 1 shows how support for Ukraine's territorial integrity (including the Crimea) is high regardless of region or ethnicity. In a separate poll of Russian élites in Ukraine, which asked them what status the Crimea should possess, 53% replied the same as any other *oblast*. Only 44% supported an autonomous status while a minority of the remainder supported its transfer to Russia.[28] Even in the Crimea there is no majority for its transfer to the Russian Federation. Table 2 backs up the statistics found in Table 1 by reflecting how support for separatism in the Crimea is on average backed by only a third of its inhabitants. The Crimean Centre for Strategic Research, which has conducted these opinion polls

Table 1. 'To whom should the Crimea belong?'

	L'viv	Kyiv	Donets'k	Simferopol
Ukraine	78.2	75.2	58	16
Independent state	8.8	5.6	14.7	24.5
Russian Federation	3	1.9	7.5	36.5
Other	2.3	1.6	2.5	3.5
Don't know	7.8	15.7	17.4	9.5

Source: Politychyi portret Ukraiiny, No. 13, 1995, p. 59.

Table 2. 'Do you share the idea of the possibility of the Crimea seceding from Ukraine?'

	Russians	Ukrainians	Tatars	Others
Yes	37.8	20.5	11.4	29.4
No	31.3	40.9	54.2	41.0
Don't know	15.5	16.1	20.3	7.5
Other	17.4	22.5	14.1	22.1
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Crimean Centre for Strategic Research (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 9 February 1999).

Table 3. 'Do you support the Crimea becoming a part of Russia?'

	Russians	Ukrainians	Tatars	Others
Yes	71.5	51.4	23.8	67.8
No	10.5	20.7	40.1	15.3
Undecided	8.2	11.2	21.8	9.4
Other	9.8	16.7	14.3	7.4
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Crimean Centre for Strategic Research (*Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 9 February 1999).

since 1993, found that there was hostility in the Crimea to Kyiv's policies but not hostility to Ukraine as an entity or any support for its disintegration. Multiple pan-eastern Slavic/Soviet Ukrainian identities in the Crimea (as in the Donbas) are more popular than separatism. This is clearly seen in relation to the Crimea in Table 3 and in numerous opinion polls in the Donbas which give support for Ukrainian membership in the Russian–Belarusian union at between 50–75%.[29]

Crimeans, therefore, like their Donbas counterparts, largely oppose their region's separation from Ukraine (with which it has long been associated in the Soviet Ukrainian SSR) while supporting Ukraine's entire membership of a pan-eastern Slavic union and/or a revived USSR.[30] The strongest supporters of such a policy are the communists who, perhaps not surprisingly therefore, have also been a strong opponent of separatism in both the Crimea and the Donbas, two regions with long historical ties to both Ukraine and Russia. The election of the leader of Crimea's communists, Leonid Grach, to the post of Crimean Supreme Soviet speaker in 1998 enabled the Crimea to obtain its first post-Soviet constitution in December of that year which was ratified by the Ukrainian parliament because it supported Ukraine's territorial integrity.[31]

The former USSR has bequeathed other legacies to post-communist Ukraine. Ukraine's territory includes not only the Donbas, attached by Bolsheviks to Ukraine in 1918 to ensure a communist presence, and the Crimea, transferred in 1954. As already discussed, these two Donbas *oblasts*' and an autonomous republic are inhabited by ten million people many of whom possess multiple identities. This, in itself, complicates the forging of Ukrainian national unity and consensus, which, as outlined in section one, are vital to the success of democratization and marketization in post-communist countries, such as Ukraine.

The multiple identities inherited by Ukraine were deliberately fostered by the Soviet regime from the thirties. If the twenties' policies of indigenization

had not been halted by the early thirties, Ukraine would not have been saddled with these multiple identities. Indigenization (*korenizatsiia*) would have led to a process of modernization similar to that found in western Europe and north America. Industrialization and urbanization in the twenties was coupled with the mobility of Ukrainian-speaking peasants into towns and cities where institutions and facilities provided a Ukrainian-language and cultural framework. If the policies of indigenization had been allowed to continue beyond the twenties, peasants with a largely regional, pre-modern identity would have become nationally conscious Ukrainians and nation building would have been facilitated. The urban and industrial centres of eastern Ukraine bequeathed to Ukraine in 1992 would have been not only Ukrainian-speaking, but also imbued with a Ukrainian national identity and culture. Instead, Soviet policies since the thirties left a legacy of confused Russian and Ukrainian identities in this region.

The continuation of indigenization was deemed to be too dangerous by Soviet leader Jozef Stalin because of the fear that it would have eventually led to political demands (such as independence or a confederal USSR) and led to a widespread differentiation of Ukrainians from Russians (i.e. nation building). From the thirties, Soviet nationality policies therefore promoted a 'Little Russian' identity where Ukrainians were the 'younger brothers' of Russians and one of three peoples to form the future core Russian-speaking Soviet nation. These policies mainly affected the large urban centres of Ukraine where modernization and industrialization became increasingly associated with Russian language and culture and Ukrainian that of a lower form of rural provincialism. Although Russian-speaking, these Sovietophiles should not be confused with ethnic Russians; the Soviet regime's policies of 'federal colonialism' were *not* tantamount to Russian nation building. Sovietophiles may have an allegiance to a larger Russian cultural and linguistic milieu but they should not be confused with ethnic Russians.[32] Guboglo defines these Sovietophiles as possessing a 'binary polyethnicity' because they have lost half of their national culture while failing to acquire another.[33] Attracted to both Ukraine and Russia this eastern Ukrainian identity is marginal, ambivalent, inconsistent, 'but vacillating on the margin between the two'.[34] Identity in eastern and southern Ukraine is, therefore, 'unstable and in transit',[35] exhibiting a high degree of 'plasticity'.[36] Shevchuk defines this as an 'inter-identity', a product of Russian–Ukrainian historical contact and of Soviet nationality policies: 'Inter-identity defies parameters of cultural, linguistic and ethnic attribution, being located as it were on the border, in the area of overlap between Russian and Ukrainian identities.'[37]

In 1945, Ukraine also inherited another ten million people in seven *oblasts'* which had historically existed outside Tsarist Russia or the USSR. Four of these western Ukrainian *oblasts'* (Galicia and Bukovina) underwent Magosci's three stages of nation building[38] under Austrian rule prior to 1918 while another three (Volhynia and Trans-Carpathia) participated in nation building in the inter-war years. During the inter-war and immediate post-war years western Ukrainian identity was strengthened by armed conflict with Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and Soviets (the latter until the early fifties). A robust identity defined against 'Others' therefore emerged in western (but not eastern) Ukraine.

After its incorporation into the former USSR, nation building in western Ukraine was facilitated, ironically, by the Soviet regime. Urban centres in western Ukraine had largely been populated by non-Ukrainians prior to the Soviet

annexation in 1939, but after 1945, western Ukrainians moved in large numbers into largely empty urban centres, emptied as a consequence of wartime genocide against Jews and the Soviet ethnic cleansing of Poles. The incorporation of western Ukraine into the USSR helped to consolidate Ukrainian nation building becoming, in the late Gorbachev era, the locomotive driving the movement to independence.[39]

The Soviet modernization of western Ukraine therefore complimented nation building. L'viv, western Ukraine's largest city, was repopulated by Ukrainians after 1945 (in contrast, the link between modernization and nation building had been halted in eastern Ukraine in the early thirties). By the post-war era Ukraine's urban centres and Soviet Ukrainian institutions were demographically dominated by Ukrainians. But, because nation building and modernization only occurred simultaneously in western Ukraine, the bulk of the republic's largest urban and industrial centres in eastern Ukraine became cultural vacuums. They were the scene of Soviet—not Ukrainian—nation building; thereby, although Russian-speaking, they remained devoid of either Ukrainian or Russian culture.[40] Consequently, Ukraine's large urban centres, symbols of the state's modernity and membership of the second world, do not possess national identity and cannot therefore fully participate in civil society.[41]

Soviet nationality policies had deliberately played off eastern Ukrainians from their western Ukrainian 'bourgeois nationalist' counterparts which has complicated national unity since Ukraine became an independent state. Soviet-ophiles in the Donbas still feel greater affinity for Russians in the Russian Federation than with western Ukrainians who are regarded as somehow 'differ-ent'. Sovietophiles do not also see Soviet power as imported and alien—unlike western Ukrainians. As a consequence of this complicated history and Soviet nationality policies, independent Ukraine inherited three regional components:

- *western Ukraine* (ten million inhabitants): a modern Ukrainian-speaking nation where modernization and nation building took place simultaneously;
- *central Ukraine* (lying between western Ukraine and the Donbas/Crimea, with 30 million inhabitants): a Ukrainian-speaking and bilingual semi-modern Ukrainian identity;
- *Donbas and the Crimea* (ten million inhabitants): Russian-speaking Sovietophiles.

Guboglo believes that the existence of an independent Ukrainian state will help facilitate a decline in Sovietophiles which, in turn, will help strengthen democratization (Sovietophiles tend to be supporters of the left and desire a revival of the former USSR; they are therefore prominent in the Donbas and the Crimea).[42] Although only a minority of Ukrainians (approximately a quarter to a third) are Sovietophiles, 'the legacy of the Soviet system and the identity-forming cultural practices, values, and orientations it created are not so easily dispelled'.[43] Reorientation towards support for Ukraine's post-Soviet quadruple transition will have to take place in the cultural, familial, professional and the ideological fields. As Wanner points out in her anthropological study of post-Soviet Ukraine:

> Practices and values spawned by the Soviet system and nostalgia for the security of a Soviet-way of life persist and compete with a national redefinition of self and society providing alternative non-national points of orientation for individuals reassessing their values and identities.[44]

Wanner continues:

> When that ideology has informed an entire social system for seventy-four years, a rejection, even if cogently articulated, cannot erase the fact that the ideology has already dramatically informed the thinking, values, and characteristics of those who were subject to it.[45]

Ukraine's quadruple transition

Ukraine entered the post-Soviet era with the unenviable task of undertaking not two or three but four transitions simultaneously. Its inherited national legacy from the former USSR, as I have argued earlier, presents it with major obstacles to the successful early completion of its quadruple transition and influences its course, speed and trajectory. Ukraine inherited a population largely supportive of its inherited frontiers (as argued in the first section, bounded territories are an important requirement for liberal democratic polities and market economies). Nevertheless, after decades of Soviet policies pitting eastern against western Ukraine, national unity remains elusive. The leader of the Slavic Unity party continues to complain that, 'Year after year, the Donbas is used as a milking cow to feed either certain regional clans or the western *oblasts'*.'[46] Ukrainian leaders travelling around Ukraine inevitably talk with one voice in western Ukraine (the need to strengthen independence and sovereignty) and another in the east (the need to develop friendly relations with Russia).[47]

In Ukraine there is, perhaps unsurprisingly, no uniform set of values and view of history incorporated within an overarching societal culture and civic national identity which are necessary for the functioning of a liberal democracy. These common values and views of the past are still in the throes of transition from the Soviet era. The attitudes of the Ukrainian population to the future is inevitably linked to their view of the past:[48]

- *Slavophiles/Sovietophiles*: if they see Ukraine as an integral part of the east Slavic space or the former USSR they will argue in favour of Ukraine's future tied to Russia. Slavophiles with multiple identities will tend to be opposed to Ukraine's quadruple transition;
- *westernizers*: if the past record of Ukrainian–Russian union is perceived as illegitimate then they will seek closer ties to the west and central Europe. Westernizers will therefore be largely supportive of Ukraine's quadruple transition.

These two views of the past and future inevitably colour contemporary political preferences. They are less a clash over civilization than different perceptions and visions of Ukraine's past and future.[49] Slavophiles in the first group, which includes Sovietophiles and others from central Ukraine, include left-wing parties, entrepreneurs involved in Ukrainian–Russian financial industrial groups, the socially poor, some regional leaders and sections of the military–industrial complex co-operating with the Russian Federation. Westernizers in the second group include the policy-making élites (particularly in the realm of foreign and security policies), pro-reform national democratic, liberal and social democratic parties, businessmen oriented towards the private sector, financial and banking circles.[50]

It is clear from the above two-fold division that westernizers support, to varying degrees, Ukraine's quadruple transition while Sovietophiles seek to completely reverse it or slow it down (Slavophiles). Nevertheless, westernizers and Slavophiles are themselves both divided into radicals and pragmatists:

- *radical westernizers*: national democrats (western-central Ukraine: usually Ukrainophones with a robust national identity);
- *pragmatic westernizers*: centrists, social democrats and liberals (central and eastern Ukraine: Ukrainophones and bilinguals with a weaker, more fluid identity);
- *pragmatic Slavophiles*: socialist and rural parties (central Ukraine: Ukrainophones and bilinguals with a fluid identity);
- *radical Slavophiles (Sovietophiles)*: communists and progressive socialists (eastern Ukraine, especially the Donbas and the Crimea: Russophones with a eastern Slavic and/or Soviet identity).

Politics

Ukraine's ruling élites—presidents, prime ministers, parliamentary chairmen— only hail from the pragmatic Slavophile or westernizer camps (Leonid Kravchuk, Leonid Kuchma, Oleksandr Moroz, Yevhen Marchuk). In the knowledge that any shift to either the radical Slavophile or westernizer camps would be likely to lead to instability in Ukraine, political competition is inevitably pushed towards the centre ground. Therefore, any promotion of a radical agenda (either Slavophile or westernizer), 'will disturb the balance on the party-political and social fields as well as in relations between the financial–industrial élite, the regions (between the west and east), and so forth'.[51] Consequently, the majority of political leaders, parties and political hopefuls stress their 'centrism' (that is, pragmatism). This appeals to the cautious Ukrainian 'man/woman in the street', the inhabitants of central Ukraine who represent the bulk of the country's population. Central Ukraine here represents not only the geographic centre of Ukraine (lying between the two polar opposites of the Donbas/Crimea and western Ukraine, which are largely supportive of the radical Slavophile and westernizer camps) respectively, but also centrist in the political and cultural sense.

Former Prime Minister Valerii Pustovoitenko believes that the emergence of 'centrism' in the post-Soviet states is a natural reaction against both the radical left and right who were influential in the Gorbachev and early post-Soviet eras. This 'centrism' is a 'policy of common sense' which 'rejects all kinds of utopias', a factor which, Pustovoitenko believes, has made it the most popular political influence in post-Soviet societies such as Ukraine. Pustovoitenko believes that Ukrainian 'centrism' is composed of the following eight attributes:[52]

- support for gradual socio-economic reforms and change;
- consistent actions by the authorities;
- emphasis upon Ukrainian traditions;
- no 'primitive imitation' of 'alien' or 'historical stereotypes';
- protectionist support for domestic producers;
- rejection of 'economic westernization';
- protection of domestic capital;
- social justice.

Rapid democratization in Ukraine is hampered by the tendency for Ukrainian politics to congregate in the centre, a trend which is, in turn, exacerbated by the national factor. Democratization cannot but be slowed by the fact that the country's largest party—the communists—stand opposed to independent statehood. This factor is particularly acute during election campaigns when incumbents call upon 'patriots' to 'unite' in the face of an alleged left-wing 'threat' to statehood and reforms. The authorities hoped—and were successful in repeating the 1996 Russian presidential elections where negative voting led to a victory for the incumbent because of the fear of a left-wing victory. That, at least, is the theory.

Key campaign strategists therefore tirelessly promoted Kuchma as the only candidate who could defeat the left-wing 'threat'[53] in the October 1999 presidential elections as he was, 'the guarantee of the constitution and the status quo'.[54] Kuchma himself warned that, 'All of us must make a choice between statehood and amorphousness, between reforms and a retreat, between democracy or totalitarianism.'[55] It is obvious which side of the fence Kuchma places himself on. Any attempts to alter the direction of reforms 'are extremely dangerous', Kuchma believes, because, 'They pose a threat to statehood and national security.' The dismantling of the former Soviet totalitarian system, which broke down 'under the burden of its own internal contradictions', is, therefore, historically the correct course for Ukraine, Kuchma told a large gathering of economists to discuss his 'Ukraine-2010' programme.[56]

Kuchma closely identifies with this centrist, pragmatic westernizer camp because it is more closely in tune with the quintessential central Ukraine. Neither anti-Russian nor anti-western, it seeks to define Ukraine within the ideological parameters of what we would identify as social democracy and liberalism. This centrist area of the Ukrainian political spectrum is still the most underdeveloped and only came late on the political scene in 1992–3; that is, it did not take part in the drive to independence (which was defined as a struggle by 'nationalists' against 'imperial communists').[57] As westernizers they, like their radical counterparts, still seek to eventually integrate into 'Europe' and limit their involvement in the CIS to bilateral economic issues. Nevertheless, they recognize that Ukraine does have national interests in the post-Soviet area which need to be defended (for example, through the pro-NATO GUUAM[58] group) and, unlike their radical counterparts, do not, therefore, call for Ukraine's withdrawal from the CIS. Pragmatic westernizers are also more willing to take Ukraine's regional inheritance and national composition into account when formulating their policies, particularly in the field of nation building. Like their radical counterparts they are strong supporters of Ukraine's territorial integrity, insist on all neighbours legally recognizing current borders and resolutely oppose through non-violent methods all manifestations of separatism.

In the Ukrainian presidential elections of summer 1994, the main contest was framed by the incumbent, Kravchuk, as one between himself, the *derzhavnyk*, and an 'opponent of statehood' (Kuchma). In the October 1999 presidential elections Kravchuk was a member of the ruling council of *Zlahoda*, Kuchma's election bloc, as was Ivan Pliushch, Kravchuk's former ally in his role as parliamentary chairman (1991–4). The incumbent was again pitted against the main 'threat' to statehood—although this time from a left-winger. The perceived left-wing threat to Ukraine's independence again forced former political enemies to unite 'in defence of state-

hood'. Yet, aside from the election rhetoric both Kuchma and moderate socialist Moroz were never a 'threat' to Ukrainian statehood and all came from the pragmatic pro-statehood wing of Ukrainian politics.

The popularity of centrism is a product of the nationality problem inherited from the Soviet era. Centrism undoubtedly has some benefits for divided post-Soviet societies such as Ukraine, as it prevents social or ethnic instability. The pragmatic camp, which is the main support base for centrism based upon central Ukraine, would not represent the majority of public opinion if Tsarist and Soviet nationality policies had not served to divide the titular nation and Ukraine along regional lines. Post-Soviet states, such as the three Baltic states, where the titular nations are not divided, have therefore larger radical westernizer camps. This, in turn, provides a greater support base for political and economic reforms. Discussion of this question by 'transitologists' has, however, ignored this link between low national consciousness and low support for economic reforms.[59]

But centrism also has a negative side. Its stability, which has been a hallmark of Ukraine's transition, also leads to stagnation and slow progress in reform. A stronger radical westernizer camp (as in the three Baltic states and Poland) would provide for greater momentum in the 'return to Europe' agenda which is a key incentive to undertake radical domestic reforms to prepare the country for future NATO and EU membership. A large pragmatic camp, in contrast, means slower reform, an inability to separate from the CIS, close economic ties to Russia and slower progress towards 'Europe' (which is evidenced in Ukraine).

Movement in either direction for Ukraine (Europe or Eurasia) is blocked because movement towards either would lead to a loss of power by the ruling pragmatic élites. A radical movement towards Europe would require a greater struggle against corruption, radical structural reforms, an end to hidden subsidies to favoured economic sectors, transparency, a reduction of state interference in the economy, an end to rent seeking, greater support for the development of a multi-party system and civil society, an independent media and a halt to threats to democratization. These are not on the immediate horizon in Ukraine. A radical move towards Eurasia is also perceived as a threat because Ukraine would, as a consequence of how they are perceived by Russians, become a Russian dominion in a manner like Belarus (and not an equal partner). Such a *gubernisation* of Ukraine means a loss of power for the ruling élites and therefore is not a popular option among them.

The current policies of neutrality (defined as 'integration with Europe, co-operation with the CIS') favoured by the pragmatic westernizers in Ukraine are better suited to an élite strategy which prefers to keep Russia at bay while issuing declarations in favour of a 'return to Europe' that are not backed up by domestic reforms and are divorced from public opinion.[60] Sergei Karaganov, head of the Russian Foreign and Defence Council, has long remained pessimistic about the chances of Ukraine joining the Russian–Belarusian union. Consequently, Karaganov believes that 'hopes for some sort of Slav unity have little foundation'.[61] This is because:

> Practically all Ukrainian elite groups do not want unification with Russia even if they say they do … The 'longing for Russia' is caused by the need for resources, such as oil, gas, electricity and energy. The Kyiv establishment is not going to give up the acquired privileges. Therefore, the communists, socialists, and capitalists alike are going to fight to keep these privileges. The Kyiv establishment is too

scared of rapprochement with Moscow because it understands that it will lose the competition with the elites of our country.[62]

Ukrainian politics and its post-Soviet transition is also influenced in other ways by the national question. The five years between presidential elections is usually divided into two distinct periods:

- *during the early period of the presidency*: newly elected leaders seek to stress national unity over regional voting patterns. The amorphous centrist reform camp (pragmatic westernizers) is unable to take on the anti-reform left itself, particularly the anti-state independence Communist party. They therefore seek out allies within the pro-reform camp (radical westernizers) which requires them to also stress their defence of statehood, be tough on separatism and orientate the country towards 'Europe', rather than towards Russia or the CIS;
- *during the latter period of the presidency*: as the incumbent comes closer to the presidential elections he undertakes a number of camouflaged policy changes. Firstly, he moderates both his commitment to reform by stressing social welfare and the repayment of wage arrears (through, for example, printing money) and a more 'civilized' path to the market.[63] Secondly, he stresses the 'strategic partnership' with Russia[64] and mellows his pro-western foreign policies.

These dual-track policies are again directly linked to the national question. The newly elected incumbent president requires the support of radical westernizers (who, as we have seen, are largely from areas of Ukraine with a high national consciousness) to promote his reform programme, which is initially a product of post-election euphoria. He also needs the support of radical westernizers in his policies of state-nation building because Ukraine's élites still perceive their main threat as coming from Russia. Civil society is also more active within those areas of Ukraine where radical westernizers are popular and therefore the incumbent president has no choice but to take heed of their high degree of civic activism.

As the presidential elections approach, the incumbent's mind is focused upon how best to be re-elected. Russophones and Sovietophiles, as a number of authors have pointed out,[65] hold an amorphous identity. Their main influence on Ukrainian politics is limited to the election process, because in between elections they exhibit a low degree of civic activism. In the election campaigns, the incumbent therefore is aware that eastern Ukraine, with its larger number of voters, will elect the next president. Consequently, the incumbent has no choice but to moderate his reform programme and place greater emphasis upon the eastern orientation of his foreign policy, which is popular among eastern Ukrainian voters.

In other words, it is difficult to see how a president could be elected in Ukraine who is a radical reformer, anti-Russian and pro-western as these policies are not popular among eastern Ukrainians. Nevertheless, as I have argued earlier, statements in favour of a 'strategic partnership' with Russia or calls for a 'return to Europe', made at different times during the presidency, are merely declarations, as Ukraine's ruling élites cannot move towards Europe while also fearing any eastward integration which would transform Ukraine into a Russian *gubernia.* As Ukraine can neither adopt the 'Baltic' (return to Europe) or the

'Belarusian' (return to Eurasia) options it is fated to be stuck where it is, unable to clearly define its national interests and strategic orientation until greater progress has been made in its quadruple transition.

Civil society

The national question is slowing the development of both a civil society and a multi-party system in Ukraine. Only two areas of Ukrainian politics—the radical westernizers (national democrats) and radical Slavophiles (communists)—have clearly defined ideological groups committed to a set of policies and objectives. But, these two represent a minority of public opinion. Public opinion, public values, political culture and regional identities lie in what I have termed central Ukraine, lying geographically, culturally and politically within both pragmatic camps in the area between western Ukraine and the Donbas/Crimea. The political forces (for example, Hromada, the four social democratic parties, the Peasant and Agrarian parties, the Greens, Liberals, party of Regional Revival, and others) lying in these two large groups are amorphous, weakly defined, constantly shifting their allegiances and without a clear ideological identity, fluctuating between an orientation towards Europe or Eurasia (or both). Their amorphousness, which provided them with the name *boloto* (the bog) in the 1994–8 parliament, means they are easily manipulated.[66]

This amorphousness within both pragmatic camps also influences the degree to which the left can evolve towards a post-communist identity, similar to that held in central-eastern Europe by former communist parties. Moroz, leader of the Socialists, would clearly like to see himself as Ukraine's version of Poland's President Alexander Kwasniewski, committed to reform and oriented towards integration into Europe. But, Moroz's Socialist party has only a quarter of the members that the unreconstituted Communist party possesses and relied heavily on its Peasant party allies in the March 1998 parliamentary elections. The divisions within the titular nation, outlined in the second section, and the presence of a Russian-speaking Sovietophile group nostalgic for the former USSR, prevent the evolution of the Communist party towards a post-communist agenda. Instead, the communists remain within the radical Slavophile camp as a party hostile to all aspects of reform, anti-western, pro-Russian and in favour of a revived USSR.[67]

Regional divisions

Ukraine is a paradox of modernity. The regions with the most active civil society are those which are the least industrialized—western Ukraine. Large urban centres and industrial regions in eastern Ukraine exhibit low levels of civic activism. Theories of nationalism would argue the opposite. Namely, that regions which are the most industrialized and urbanized are products of the modern era and therefore should be the scene of a vibrant civil society and robust national identity. Why is this not the case? Although 12 million Russians live mainly in eastern and southern Ukraine there are practically no Russian civic groups and political parties outside of the Crimea. Ternopil *oblast'* in western Ukraine, for example, is one of Ukraine's most rural regions and yet has the highest degree of national consciousness, as measured by its voting record and participation in referenda. The reasons are not too difficult to find.

Table 4. To what degree is political sovereignty important?

	Not very important	Medium importance	Very important	Total importance (medium and very)
West	15	44	36	80
Centre	24	30	33	66
South	20	31	37	68
East	39	24	27	51
Crimea	36	15	20	35

Source: Den', 26 June 1997.

Table 4 illustrates the results of a poll questioning the degree to which political sovereignty is felt to be important in the regions.

The second section of this article investigated the legacy of Soviet nationalities policies upon contemporary Ukraine's quadruple transition. It found that this legacy was divided into two:

- *central, eastern and southern Ukraine*: these regions encompassed the Soviet Ukrainian SSR until 1939. The policies of indigenization promoted in the twenties led to the influx of Ukrainian peasants with regional, pre-modern identities into urban centres during a period of rapid urbanization and industrialization. These policies of indigenization were halted in the early thirties. Ukrainians came to demographically dominate its urban and indus- trial centres of modernity but they did not dominate them culturally. Soviet nationality policies from the thirties promoted Soviet—not Ukrainian—nation building which, although based on the Russian language and the three eastern Slavs, left a legacy of urban centres with neither a Russian nor a Ukrainian identity. Urban centres with no national identity have been unable to create a vibrant civil society and have therefore fallen prey to nostalgia for the former USSR (particularly on the part of Sovietophiles in the Donbas and the Crimea);
- *western Ukraine*: this region had largely remained outside the Russian empire (except for Volhynia annexed from Poland after its partition in the late eighteenth century). Ironically, the policies of indigenization were successfully promoted here by a Soviet regime which capitalized upon the emptying of west Ukrainian towns of Jews and Poles and the fact that its policies were adapted to take into account the strength of Ukrainian nationalism.[68] The drive to modernity in western Ukraine therefore took place in conjunction with the spread of Ukrainian demographic and cultural control of its urban centres. In the post-Soviet era civil society could not only revive the traditions of the pre- war era but also flourish in an environment where urban centres were dominated by a high degree of Ukrainian national identity. What was success- fully accomplished in western Ukraine after 1945 had been prevented in the remainder of the country from the early thirties.

Ethnic relations

Are Ukraine's 'nationalists' only confined to the radical, westernizer camp? Wilson, for example, limits Ukrainian 'nationalism' to only ethnic Ukrainians

whose first language is Ukrainian.[69] Unfortunately, this leads him to accuse them of promoting 'nationalist' policies, policies which would be normal practice for governments in most countries (defence of culture and language, energy security).[70] This definition of 'nationalism', of course, depends upon how the term is defined. Radical westernizers do tend to be anti-Russian because they are predominantly based in western Ukraine and therefore hold similar views to their Baltic counterparts as to their country being the last outpost of 'Europe' and Russia as an inferior, hostile Asian 'Other'.[71]

But when discussing nationalism in Ukraine, we should not discount the Soviet nationalistic rhetoric of the radical Slavophile camp. Radical Slavophile hostility to the west, US 'hegemony', NATO, the IMF, the World Bank and 'international capital' is also framed in nationalist rhetoric, but of an opposite kind to that found in the radical westernizers camp. Radical Slavophiles accuse all of these institutions and countries of causing a decline in Ukraine's population and thereby its 'genocide', a collapse in the country's GDP, erosion of the country's industrial base and opposing Ukraine's 'brotherly relations' and integration with the other eastern Slavs. In the post-Soviet era ethnic Ukrainian nationalism, which proved to be a major force in propelling Ukraine to independence, is evolving into civic nationalism which will bridge the gulf between radical and pragmatic westernizers.[72] There is no question that the wide gulf between radical (Kravchuk) and pragmatic westernizers (Kuchma) which existed in the summer 1994 presidential elections is narrowing, as seen by the evolution of Kuchma in power and his wide choice of non-left political allies.

Nevertheless, Ukrainian nationalism, in the same manner as nationalism elsewhere, is only likely to evolve towards a more civic composition if a number of conditions are met:

- an end to the perceived, or real, threat from Russia (where upwards of three-quarters of the population do not regard Ukrainians as a separate ethnic group);
- Ukrainian culture and language become more securely entrenched and widespread, *vis-à-vis* its deplorable state in the Soviet era and the perceived continued threat from Russian cultural hegemony;
- consolidation of the Ukrainian titular nation, giving it greater self-confidence;
- a majoritarian Ukrainian cultural influence in its urban centres.

Ukrainian nationalism is unlikely to evolve into a more civic variant until progress has been made on these four national questions which, as outlined in the first section, are key prerequisites for a successful liberal democracy and market economy. If there is little—or no—progress in these four areas, Ukrainian nationalism will be unable to become civic, bridge the gap between radical and pragmatic westernizers and thereby create a semblance of national unity. It is little wonder that Ukrainian nationalism is today closer to insecure Basque nationalism, although non-violent, than to contemporary self-confidant Catalonian and Scottish civic nationalism.

The conservative pragmatism of central Ukraine acts as a buffer between the Sovietophile and ethnic Ukrainian nationalisms of the Donbas/Crimea and western Ukraine respectively, thereby preventing ethnic conflict. If Soviet nationality policies had not left this legacy of a divided titular nation and regionalism,

Ukrainian-Russian /Sovietophile conflict may have been likely in the post-Soviet era:

- a stronger national-democratic movement would have produced greater all-Ukrainian public support for the drive to independence which would have meant that Rukh on its own, without the aid of the national communists, would have achieved independence. As in the Baltic and Trans-Caucasian republics a nationalist would have been elected president in December 1991 (and not a national communist);
- this may have been favourable for reform and de-communization, but it would have probably led to conflict along the lines of that experienced in the Caucasus and Moldova, particularly in the Crimea. National democrats (as in Estonia where demands for autonomy for Narva have been rejected) would have looked unfavourably at the 1990–1 Crimean demands for the elevation of their *oblast'* to an autonomous republic. Twelve million people who designated themselves as ethnic Russians in the 1989 Soviet census would feel threatened by the nationality policies of the new state which portrayed them and the Russian Federation as the 'Other';
- the declaration of independence by the Crimean Supreme Soviet in May 1992 might have been handled violently, possibly leading to the intervention by the large and well-equipped forces of the Black Sea Fleet (Russian forces also intervened in Moldova, Georgia and during the Armenian-Azeri war);
- the Crimea (as with the Trans-Dniester region, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Kara-bakh) could have then been left beyond the *de facto* control of the central Ukrainian authorities. The Crimea would be recognized *de jure* as a part of Ukraine but *de facto* it could have been beyond the control of the central authorities and turned into a Russian protectorate (similar to Abkhazia and the Trans-Dniester region).

Paradoxically, pragmatic centrism, a product of Soviet nationality policies may, therefore be bad for the speed of its quadruple transition but good in terms of maintaining stability and ethnic peace.

Conclusion

This article has laid out the case that, while a welcome step forward, the enlargement of the field of enquiry for 'transitology' to include stateness, as well as democratization and marketization, to become a 'triple transition' still provides an incomplete picture. As Canovan persuasively argues, nationhood remains at the heart of liberal democracies and hence the national question (here meaning such factors as national unity and identity, a societal culture, commonly held values, regionalism and separatism) are central questions for countries, such as Ukraine, emerging from centuries of empire and decades of totalitarianism. Any study of the post-Soviet transition in Ukraine will therefore remain incomplete without including four—not two or three—interrelated factors: stateness, nationhood, democratization and marketization.

Notes

1. C. Offe, 'Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe', *Social Research*, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1991, pp. 865–81.
2. A. Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy*, Cambridge, 1995, p. 11.
3. Ibid., A. Przeworski, *Sustainable Democracy*, p. 12.
4. G. L. Munck, 'Bringing Postcommunist Societies into Democratization Studies', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 56, No. 3, 1997, p. 545.
5. J. A. Hall's 'double transition' is defined as a) democratization and marketization and b) nation building. See his 'In Search of Civil Society', in J. A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society. Theory, History, Comparison*, Cambridge, 1996, p. 22. Offe's 'triple transition' refers to democratization, marketization and state building. See *op. cit.*, C. Offe, 'Capitalism by Democratic Design?' For an alternative viewpoint see my own 'Ukraine: A Four-Pronged Transition' in T. Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine. Dynamics of Post-Soviet Transformation*, Armonk, NY, 1998, pp. 165–80.
6. A. J. Motyl, 'The Non-Russian States', *Freedom Review*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 1997, p. 53.
7. *Op. cit.*, C. Offe, 'Capitalism by Democratic Design?', p. 866.
8. D. Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy. Towards a Dynamic Model', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1970, p. 350.
9. Ibid., p. 363.
10. See T. Kuzio, 'National Identity and Foreign Policy: The East Slavic Conundrum' in *op. cit.*, T. Kuzio (ed.), *Contemporary Ukraine*, pp. 221–44.
11. M. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, Cheltenham, 1996, p. 28.
12. D. Miller, *On Nationality*, Oxford, 1997, p. 162.
13. Ibid, p. 140.
14. B. Parekh, 'Cultural Pluralism and the Limits of Diversity', *Alternatives*, Vol. 20, No. 4, 1995, p. 437.
15. B. Parekh, 'Discourses on National Identity', *Political Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1994, p. 502.
16. *Op. cit.*, M. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory*, p. 137.
17. Ibid., p. 22.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., pp. 73–4. Canovan believes that, 'This capacity for long-term mobilization is also, I suggest, the best available test of whether or not a nation actually exists' (p. 74).
20. L. Binder, 'National Integration and Political Development', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 58, No. 3, 1964, p. 628.
21. A 1993–4 poll found that 25–26% were simultaneously Russian and Ukrainian. See P. S. Pirie, 'National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 48, No. 7, 1996, p. 1087.
22. See V. Vujacic, 'Historical Legacies, Nationalist Mobilization and Political Outcomes in Russia and Serbia: A Weberian View', *Theory and Society*, Vol. 25, No. 6, 1996, pp. 763–801.
23. M. McAuley, *Russia's Politics of Uncertainty*, Cambridge, 1997, p. 300.
24. Ibid., p. 16.
25. Every year the Russian Federation celebrates its 'Independence Day' based upon the June 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty. Whereas the 16 July 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty is a state holiday in Ukraine, 'Independence Day' is celebrated on 24 August, the day in 1991 when the Ukrainian parliament declared independence from the USSR.
26. See V. Tolz, 'Forging the Nation: National Identity and Nation Building in Postcommunist Russia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 6, 1998, pp. 993–1022 and 'Conflicting "Homeland Myths" and Nation-State Building in Postcommunist Russia', *Slavic Review*, Vol. 57, No. 2, 1998, pp. 267–94.
27. See Chapter One, 'Post-colonialism and Borderland Identities' in G. Smith, V. Law, A. Wilson, A. Bohr and E. Allworth, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities*, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 1–22.
28. 'Russkiye na Ukraine', Kyiv Centre for Political Research and Conflict Studies, July 1997.
29. A poll in Donets'k gave 58% support for Ukraine's membership of the Russian–

Belarusian union (*Sotsial'no-Politicheskaya Situatsiya v Ukraine*, Ukrainian Centre for Political Research and Conflict Studies, Kyiv No. 9, September 1997, p. 23). Another poll by the Donets'k Information and Analytical Centre gave an even higher figure of 73% (*Holos Ukraiiny*, 4 March 1999). See also S. Shulman, 'Competing versus Complimentary Identities: Ukrainian–Russian Relations and the Loyalties of Russians in Ukraine', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1998, pp. 615–32.

30. See T. Kuzio and D. Meyer, 'The Donbas and Crimea: An Institutional and Demographic Approach to Ethnic Mobilisation in Two Ukrainian Regions', in T. Kuzio, R. S. Kravchuk and P. D'Anieri (eds), *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, New York, 1999, pp. 297–324.

31. The draft constitution was passed by the Crimean Supreme Soviet on 21 October and ratified by the Ukrainian parliament on 23 December 1998 (*Holos Ukraiiny*, 12 January 1999).

32. G. Smith and A. Wilson, 'Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora: The Potential for Political Mobilisation in Eastern Ukraine and North Eastern Estonia', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 5, 1997, pp. 845–6 and *op. cit.*, P. S. Pirie, 'National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine', p. 1085.

33. M. M. Guboglo, 'The Disintegration and Synthesis of Identity in Post-Soviet Space and Time (The Case of Ukraine)', *The Harriman Review*, Vol. 9, Nos. 1–2, 1996, p. 96.

34. *Op. cit.*, P. S. Pirie, 'National Identity and Politics in Southern and Eastern Ukraine', p. 1099.

35. Ibid., p. 1090.

36. *Op. cit.*, G. Smith and A. Wilson, 'Rethinking Russia's Post-Soviet Diaspora', p. 855.

37. Yuri I. Shevchuk, 'Citizenship in Ukraine: A Western Perspective' in J. S. Micgiel (ed.), *State and Nation Building in East Central Europe. Contemporary Perspectives*, New York, 1996, p. 355.

38. The three stages are a) heritage-gathering b) organizational and c) political. See P. R. Magosci, 'The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework', *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, Vol. XV1, Nos. 1–2, 1989, pp. 45–62.

39. Bohdan Nahaylo, *The Ukrainian Resurgence*, London, 1998, p. 432.

40. See G. O. Liber, 'Imagining Ukraine: Regional Differences and the Emergence of an Integrated State Identity, 1926–1994', *Nations and Nationalism*, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1998, pp. 187–206.

41. See T. Kuzio, *Ukraine. State and Nation Building*, London, 1998, pp. 144–66 and 'Defining the Political Community in Ukraine' in *op. cit.*, T. Kuzio, R. S. Kravchuk and P. D'Anieri (eds), *State and Institution Building in Ukraine*, pp. 213–244.

42. *Op. cit.*, M. M. Guboglo, 'The Disintegration and Synthesis of Identity in Post-Soviet Space and time', p. 102.

43. Catherine Wanner, *Burden of Dreams. History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine*, Pennsylvania, 1998, p. 18.

44. Ibid., p. 48.

45. Ibid., p. 73.

46. *Holos Ukraiiny*, 4 March 1999.

47. *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 6–12 March 1999.

48. See Rainer Munz and Rainer Ohliger, *Die Ukraine nach der Unabhangigkeit. Nationsbildung zwischen ost und West*, BIOST, No. 5, 1999.

49. President Leonid Kuchma as quoted by *Interfax*, 12 March 1999.

50. '1998 Foreign Policy Trends: Expert Poll', Center of Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, Kyiv, Annual Report.

51. *Ukraiina moloda*, 4 March 1999.

52. Quoted from Pustovoitenko's speech to the congress of the People's Democratic party of Ukraine (NDPU) in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 24 November 1998.

53. See the interview with the former head of the presidential administration, Yevhen Kushnariov, in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 26 January 1999.

54. *Vechirnyi Kyiv*, 4 March 1999.

55. Quoted from Kuchma's speech to the founding congress of *Zlahoda* in *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 20 March 1999.

56. *Uriadovyi Kurier*, 10 March 1999.

57. See T. Kuzio, *Ukraine. Perestroika to Independence*, London, 2000.

58. The GUUAM group links together the pro-western and pro-NATO countries of Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaidzhan and Moldova in the CIS. All five countries are led by pragmatic westernizers. See T. K. 'Geopolitical Pluralism in the CIS: The Rise of GUUAM: Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 47, No. 3, 2000, pp. 25–35.

59. See Paul Kubicek, 'Post-Soviet Ukraine: In Search of a Constituency for Reform', *Journal of Communist Studies & Transition Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1997, pp. 103–26. For an alternative view which links these factors see P. D'Anieri, R. S. Kravchuk and T. Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, Boulder, CO, 1999.

60. 'It is very difficult to find any influential political forces in Ukrainian society, which are really concerned about the realisation of the European vector … In Ukraine, there is no political élite, which would support foreign policy professionals in carrying out a European-orientated policy.' Quoted from 'The State and Prospects of Ukraine's Foreign Policy: Expert Discussion', Annual Report of the Ukrainian Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy of Ukraine, 1998, Kyiv, Ukraine.

61. *Moskovskiye Novosti*, 5–12 April 1998.

62. *Kievskiye Vedomosti*, 11 August 1998 and *Zerkalo Nedeli*, 6 February 1999.

63. In May 1994 then President Kravchuk promoted the left-wing, anti-reform Prime Minister Valerii Masol in order to undercut left-wing support for his opponents in the upcoming presidential elections.

64. An example of this could be seen when the *Rada* voted on 3 March 1999 to join the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly. The left have a combined vote of only 170 deputies which had thwarted earlier votes to join it. On this occasion the additional 60 deputies were 'loaned' by reformist parties (Greens and United Social Democrats) in order to boost Kuchma's election appeal among eastern Ukrainian voters.

65. See Andrew Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s. A Minority Faith*, Cambridge, 1997; and T. Kuzio, 'National Identity in Independent Ukraine: An Identity in Transition', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1996, pp. 582–608.

66. See Chapter Five, 'Politics and Civil Society' in *op. cit.*, P. D'Anieri, R. S. Kravchuk and T. Kuzio, *Politics and Society in Ukraine*, pp. 141–165.

67. See A. Wilson, 'The Ukrainian Left: In Transition to Social Democracy or Still in Thrall to the USSR?', *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 7, 1997, pp. 1293–316.

68. On the strength of the nationalist underground see Jeffrey Burds, 'AGENTURA: Soviet Informants' Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944–48', *East European Politics and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1997, pp. 89–130. For a comparison on how this affected Soviet nationality policies in western Ukraine in relation to western Belarusia, where nationalist partisans had not existed, see Roman Szporluk, 'West Ukraine and West Belarussia. Historical Tradition, Social Communication, and Linguistic Assimilation', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, 1979, pp. 76–98.

69. 'The nationalist position on the future course of Ukraine's foreign and defence policy is clear enough, and can be neatly summarized as anti-Russian and pro-European.' See *op. cit.*, A. Wilson, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s*, p. 173.

70. See my review of Wilson's volume in *International Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 2, 1997, p. 386.

71. See T. Kuzio, 'Radical Nationalist Parties and Movements in Contemporary Ukraine Before and After Independence: The Right and its Politics, 1989–1994', *Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1997, pp. 211–42.

72. H. V. Kas'ianov, 'Ukraiins'kyi natsionalizm: problema naukovo pereosmyslennia', *Ukraiins'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, No. 2, March–April 1998, pp. 39–54.